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Abstract We introduce a kind of partial observability to the projective simu-
lation (PS) learning method. It is done by adding a belief projection operator
and an observability parameter to the original framework of the efficiency of
the PS model. I provide theoretical formulations, network representations, and
situated scenarios derived from the invasion toy problem as a starting point
for some multi-agent PS models.
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1 Introduction
Even though the experimental quantum computing has been difficult to achieve,
theoretical quantum artificial intelligence and machine learning, as a branch,
has been flourishing in the recent years [24,39]. In short, and as a wish, quan-
tum computing might affordably speed up our classical coding. Furthermore,
since every quantum computation can have a classical counterpart, we may
build the classical models and think of their quantum apparitions. In this
sense, projective simulation (PS), as a new model for classical and quantum
artificial intelligence, needs to be expanded in all AI directions as a lot of
works have been done so far. Particularly, some classical studies are [1,2,3,4]
and some quantum works could be [1,20,22,21,23].
In a classical point of view, the former [1] is the original introduction of the
PS learning method through the compositional memories as well as the initial
episodic memory of a given agent. Other studies, [2,3,4], can be considered
as some expansions of the model in the existing fields of AI. Among them,
temporal correlations, associative memory and comparison with some other
learning methods as Q-learning and Learning Classifier System (XCS) have
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been discussed in ref. [2], and meta-learning or learning to learn has been in-
troduced in ref. [3]. In the latter in turn, [4], the generalization of some similar
but distinct stimuli has been studied. As other important branches, partially
observability and multi-agent approaches have been considered widely in arti-
ficial intelligence [8,7,11] and reinforcement learning [10,9] which we are about
to introduce a first step in the PS model via the current study.
A single agent in a partially observable environment may be unable to ob-
serve the current state completely where the notion of ”belief state” represents
the agent’s current belief about the current ”world state”. In this approach,
a fully observable environment is just a special case of the partial observ-
ability when the belief state (b) is equal to the current percept (s) for every
so-called world percept s at all times; therefore, partially observable artificial
intelligence (AI), as a generalization, can add more realistic examples to the
entirely observable AI scenarios [25,7].
In a multi-agent partially observable approach, despite the controversial
issue of what is a multi-agent setting1, in addition to the current world state,
the parameters of the other agents also may not be always observable for
which there are some mainstreams in the literature, such as interactive par-
tially observable [13,14,12] and decentralized partially observable [27,15,16,
17] subfields. Decentralized headlines consider local observations in a coop-
erative game with a common (joint) reward function. In this treatment, the
belief states are about the configuration of other agents as well as the world
states where the optimal solutions are computed centrally for all of the agents.
This category is then related, correspondingly, to if the system state is jointly
fully observable (by all of the agents involved) or not [11]. Likewise, in the
interactive partially observable frameworks, the belief states include beliefs
about the other agents as well as the physical environment [14]; however, in
contrast to a decentralized solution, here the formulation is applied for self-
interest agents and individual solutions. In short, if a situation were locally
observable by the agents regarding a common reward function for a coopera-
tive task, the classification would be a decentralized approach. Alternatively,
in case agents make a decision for individual self-interest games, the method is
going toward building an interactive model, giving rise to equilibrium points
and other game-theoretical issues. In both conditions, a generalized belief state
is often needed for the optimal solutions.
Another option which can be considered to a multi-agent learning view-
point is communication between the involving agents. Obviously, learning and
communication can be related to each other from learning to communicate
to communication as learning [31]. Exchanging information, on the one hand,
might increase the common-interests in a cooperative task. On the other hand,
1
“Indeed, even the seemingly simpler question–What is a (single) agent?–has resisted
a definitive answer. For our purposes, the following loose definition will suffice:
Multiagent systems are those systems that include multiple autonomous entities
with either diverging information or diverging interests, or both.” [19]
A Projective Simulation Scheme for Partially-Observable Multi-Agent Systems 3
communication can be just for self-interests since, for instance, whenever an
agent starts to help, another agent may compensate it and look forward to the
next round from which both make use of a long-term communication to have
a better individual efficiency for the separated tasks. There could be lots of
other criteria and assumptions as well.2
The context of multi-agent systems is quite interdisciplinary. It has been
used in economics to system biology and evolution, and from social science to
software engineering and robotics. Nevertheless, in the quantum domain, we
can refer to some related studies as distributed quantum computation [34,35]
and quantum game theory [36,40,41]. In this paper, after mentioning some
basic principles of projective simulation, we try to familiarize the PS learning
method with the notion of a partially observable environment. It is done by
introducing a set of environmental belief states and also an observability pa-
rameter in the formulation of efficiency. As our situated examples, we use a
multi-agent invasion setting where another agent as an interpreter teaches a
portion of the world percepts to a defender where the system states remain
jointly fully observable. Afterwards, every agent can be considered as a simulta-
neous learner-teacher wherein there could be some self-interested aspects too.
To have interactive models as well as the decentralized frameworks, however,
we look forward to having further studies including a more general belief state.
We express our evaluations classically here, though our formulation might be
modified to work also in the quantum domain.
2 Projective Simulation
Projective simulation, to put it briefly, is an embodied (situated) learning
method which representing a reductionist approach of a brain-like learning
(thinking) scheme by utilizing random walks between some network of clips
via their interface edges as episodic and compositional memories. In the ar-
ticle titled “projective simulation for artificial intelligence” [1], the authors
formulate the PS model using a toy problem as ”invasion game” and checked
the speed of learning, maximum blocking efficiency, etc. Here, we expand our
situated examples on it for the early step of introducing partial observability
and multi-agent contexts to the PS network.
As a fundamental desire, the PS learning process is considered to be decou-
pled from immediate motor action since the random walks happen between the
virtual (fictitious) percept s© and action a© clips in the memory (networks of
clips) itself which can be modified (updated); this occurs both in the number
of clips and in the transition probabilities between the clips via reflections or
some compositional properties before the real action a takes place. Due to the
assumptive capability of the content modification or creation of new clips in
2 for example see [30] as a concise review of multi-agent models in the partially observable
environments including the communication classifications withal.
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the network of clips,3 one may think of every percept clip s© or every action
clip a© just as a network clip c© in the system. For this reason, one can for-
mulate the PS model just on the network’ clips c© irrespective of the kind of
them. Therefore, the transitional probabilities between every two clips ci and
cj in the time step t can be written as a normalized conditional probability
function built of the wight transitions ω(t)(ci, cj).
P (t)(cj |ci) = ω
(t)(ci, cj)∑
k ω
(t)(ci, ck)
. (1)
Where ω(t)(ci, cj) = f(h
(t)(ci, cj)) is modified when the edges (ckl , cml) are
traversed during the last random walk as an adaptation rule of
h(t+1)(ci, cj) = h
(t)(ci, cj)− γ(h(t)(ci, cj)− 1) +
∑
l
δ(ci, ckl)δ(cj , cml)λ
(t+1)
(2)
, where 0 ≤ γ ≤ 1 is a forgetting factor (damping parameter), and λ is a non-
negative reward incrementing the related h-value function. It follows that the
forgetting factor γ in Eq. 2 can show a positive effect on speed-up learning in a
changing environment and an adverse effect on the amount of efficiency.4 The
simplest function for ω is for f(h) = h, as used in the current study as well
as previous studies.5 In addition, the weight matrix ω = h(t)(ci, cj) is initially
unit (h(1)(ci, cj) = 1) for all edges.
Subsequently, learning happens by changing the transition probabilities of
Eq. 1 on a given pair of (ci, cj) by updating the rule of Eq. 2. One can evaluate
the efficiency of learning, r(t), by adding the amounts of the desirable joint
probabilities P (n)(a∗s, s) at time t, where a
∗
s is a pleasing action on a given
percept s. Assuming that
r(t) =
∑
s
P (t)(s)P (t)(a∗s|s), P (n)(s) =
1
number of different percepts
, (3)
then we have
r(t) =
1
N
N∑
i=1
P t(a∗si |si). (4)
There are other important properties in the PS scheme such as the edge-
glow mechanism g(ci, cj) ∈ [0, 1] [2,4], which refers to a bypass reward of
g(t+1)(ci, cj)λ
(t+1) for a non-rewarded edge (ci, cj), where λ refers to a certain
reward for the next-edge (cj , ck). In other words, if an edge is rewarded, the
3 I may also think of annihilation of old useless clips or the decay of some portion of the
network (clips or edges) as a result of some neurological disorder.
4 The probabilities in projective simulation change fractionally as do in the fictitious play
models, and the role of the forgetting (dissipation) factor in the projective simulation can be
indirectly compared with the task of the discounted reward or learning factor in Q-learning
[5], or the step size parameter in the linear update scheme of reinforcement learning [6].
5 Though there could be other alternative functions like an exponential function, as men-
tioned in [4], similar to that of original reinforcement learning.
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Fig. 1 The simplest clips network representation, according to Eq.5, where γ is the damping
parameter in the adaptation rule (Eq. 2) of projective simulation
previous edge can be strengthened by a temporal correlation. In this note,
however, our examples contain only the invasion game within which one agent
in a fully observable environment performs optimally in case we do not have
such temporal correlations, where g = 0 [3]. Moreover, in the Appendix. 5,
we show that using the edge glow between two agents will destroy the partial
observability in the multi-agent setting. Accordingly, the adaptation rule of
Eq. 2 is enough for our purpose.
In the current study, we use Dirac notation, which is a useful theoretical
method in both classical AI and quantum contexts, to show the influence of
a partially observable environment on the efficiency of a given agent, though
my results are presented classically here.
3 Method
3.1 A two-agent model
In the PS context, by remembering the efficiency of Eq.4 and using a vector
notation for N different percept-actions, then
r(t) =
1
N
N∑
i=1
〈a∗si |si〉. (5)
Where the superscript t was omitted for the classical probabilities (〈a|s〉 =
P t(a|s)). A clips network representation for such a formula can be as that
shown in Fig.1. A given stochastic environment, so far, has been fully ob-
servable since the agent observes the world percepts si. However, people may
think of expanding a vector space on a different basis to make some belief
states from the world states |si〉 by other agents. As a tangible example, con-
sider another intelligent agent as an interpreter (an intelligent projector),
as illustrated in Fig. 8. We can span our real states (world states) |si〉 on the
belief states |bi〉 which are related to fictitious action clips b© in a PS learning
network performed by an interpreter (I) with regard to si. One can write a
belief projection operator [18] Bj as
Bj = |bj〉〈bj |. (6)
Then
|si〉 =
∑
j
|bj〉〈bj |si〉 ,
∑
j
〈bj |si〉 = 1. (7)
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Fig. 2 The clips network representation according to Eq.8, where γpa and γI stand for the
damping parameters of the protagonist agent and the interpreter, respectively. A protagonist
agent here is an agent who does a domain action and an interpreter stands for an agent who
performs a communication action
r(t) =
1
N
N∑
i=1
N ′∑
j=1
〈a∗si |Bj |si〉 =
1
N
N∑
i=1
N ′∑
j=1
〈a∗si |bj〉 〈bj |si〉 (8)
Here,N ′ stands for the number of possible belief states which, in the immediate
examples, are equal to the number of world states N . A network representation
containing the belief clip b© is illustrated in Fig. 2. One can also write the
belief states’ vectors with respect to the world states using an inverse matrix
for probabilities 〈bi|si〉. However, in the probability matrix of 〈bk|sk〉, the
summation of elements on a row is equal to one
∑
j 〈bj |si〉 = 1, but it is
not the case for the summation on a column
∑
j 〈bi|sj〉. We can also assume
that
δij = 〈si|sj〉 = 〈ai|aj〉 = 〈bi|bj〉 (9)
where needed. As a more general case, one can consider a combinational op-
erator (S + B)j which regards an observability parameter α for a given
environment that is some portion α of all percepts to be fully observable for a
protagonist agent, with the rest of it being partially observable. In other words,
a given world percept is visible with the probability of α and is partially visible
with the probability of 1− α.
αSj + (1 − α)Bj = α |sj〉〈sj | + (1− α) |bj〉〈bj |, (10)
r(t) =
1
N
N∑
i=1
N ′∑
j=1
〈a∗si |αSj + (1 − α)Bj |si〉, (11)
r(t) =
α
N
N∑
i=1
〈a∗si |si〉 +
1− α
N
N∑
i=1
N ′∑
j=1
〈a∗si |bj〉 〈bj |si〉. (12)
Further, we could include the imaginary space to define our generic belief
state |(S +B)j〉 as
|(S +B)j〉 =
√
α |sj〉+ i
√
1− α |bj〉, (13)
(S +B)j = |(S +B)j〉 〈(S +B)j |. (14)
Then, one can define the efficiency of Eq.12 as the real part of r(t), that is
r(t) =
1
N
N∑
i=1
N ′∑
j=1
〈a∗si |(S +B)j |si〉 (15)
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Fig. 3 A fully joint observable 2-agent network including a given protagonist agent and its
interpreter on the basis of Eq.16.
efficiency ≡ Real [r(t)] = α
N
N∑
i=1
〈a∗si |si〉 +
1− α
N
N∑
i=1
N ′∑
j=1
〈a∗si |bj〉 〈bj |si〉.(16)
A network representation for Eq. 16 is illustrated in Fig. 3. From now on, we
will refer to r as the efficiency (the real part of r in Eq.16).
Equation 13 is well-defined for our purpose in the current study. Because
the operators as |bj〉〈sj | and |sj〉〈bj | for bj 6= sj cause seemingly nonsensical
probabilities in the current study, the former will bring probabilities from
which, when a direct world state sj is seen, the action takes place for an
indirect bj, and the effect is just the opposite for the latter.
6
Suppose that we have derived the asymptotic probabilities as a function of
forgetting factors,7
〈ak|sl〉max = 〈ak|bl〉max =
{
p(γpa), k = l
q(γpa), k 6= l
, 〈bk|sl〉max =
{
p(γI), k = l
q(γI), k 6= l
(17)
, where γpa and γI stand for the protagonist agent’s forgetting factor and
interpreter’s forgetting factor, respectively. Hence, for a simple fully observable
problem with a∗si = ai, we have rmax = p(γpa), according to Eq. 4 or Eq. 5. Yet,
considering our partially observable two-agent model with |S| = |A| = |B| =
N and N ′ = N , one can use Eq. 16 according to rPO, for the asymptotic
efficiency in a partially observable environment (versus rFO preserved for a
fully observable one) and write
rPO ≡ rpamax(α, γpa, γI) = αp(γpa) + (1− α) [p(γpa).p(γI) + q(γpa).q(γI)] .
(18)
6 Operators such |c〉〈c| in the quantum regime refer to a quantum interference. In this
article, however, we are focusing on the classical learning and such quantum issues could be
considered for another study
7 For a specific reward function, see Appendix. 5
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rPO = p(γpa)
{
1− (1 − α)
[
1− p(γI)− q(γI)
p(γpa)
.q(γI)
]}
. (19)
By remembering the efficiency of a given agent in a fully observable environ-
ment, rFO = p(γpa), then
rPO = β rFO, 0 ≤ β ≤ 1 =⇒ rPO ≤ rFO. (20)
We may recall β as a transparency coefficient or µ = 1 − β as the reduction
of transparency. Besides, one can have q with respect to p according to the
specific form of h-matrix within a given problem; see Eq. 32, for instance, for
which
If p+ q (N − 1) = 1,
µ = (1− α) q(γI)
[
(N − 1)− q(γpa)
p(γpa)
]
, N ≥ 2. (21)
Our formulation can go beyond to include multi-agent games where an
interpreter could be a sort of protagonist agent by itself; a protagonist agent,
on the other hand, would be an intelligent interpreter too, so that every agent
becomes a simultaneous player-interpreter. Then, some world percepts would
be invisible for each agent while another agent can detect them and help its
partner to have more efficiency. Assuming a different forgetting factor for every
task to be done for a given agent X in a multi-agent setting containing n tasks,
we could have
γX =
n∑
k=1
γkX , 0 ≤ γX ≤ 1. (22)
In such scenarios, the parameter of observability α can also differ for the two
given agents X and Y , that is αX 6= αY . Moreover, it can be realized that the
communication is costly unless the forgetting factor of the domain actions is
set to be zero. In this particular case (that we recognize as selfishness), commu-
nication becomes free. A clips network representation for such a circumstance
is illustrated in Fig. 4 and a relevant example is elaborated in Sec. 4.3.
3.2 More than two agents
For three agents, I can think of two possible extensions; one is as
efficiency ≡ α
N
N∑
i=1
〈a∗si |si〉 +
1− α
N
N∑
i=1
N ′∑
j=1
N ′′∑
k=1
〈a∗si |ck〉 〈ck|bj〉 〈bj |si〉(23)
, for which a given clips network representation is depicted in Fig. 5. In this
form, the agents X and Y are both protagonist-interpreter and the agent
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Fig. 4 A clips network representation including two protagonist-interpreter agents accord-
ing to Eq. 22 and Eq. 16. Here, there are two blocking and teaching tasks for every agent,
namely, γX = γ1X + γ2X and γY = γ1Y + γ2Y . Furthermore, there could be different ob-
servability parameters for every agent (αX 6= αY ). A relevant situated scenario can be seen
in Sec. 4.3
Fig. 5 A given clips network representation for Eq. 23, where an additional agent Z is
introduced for a two-folded interpretation task. Here we assume that Z is an additional
interpreter for both X and Y
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Fig. 6 A given clips network representation for Eq. 24. Here, there are three protagonist-
interpreter agents and the world states remain jointly fully observable
Z is an interpreter of the interpreter. In this form, Z can be an additional
interpreter for X or Y or both of them.
Another extension could be having three protagonist-interpreter agents; let
α → α1, 1 − α = α2 + α3, so that the related efficiency will have three terms
as
α1
N
N∑
i=1
〈a∗si |si〉 +
α2
N
N∑
i=1
N ′∑
j=1
〈a∗si |bj〉 〈bj |si〉+
α3
N
N∑
i=1
N ′′∑
k=1
〈a∗si |ck〉 〈ck|si〉.(24)
A given clips network representation for Eq. 24 is illustrated in Fig. 6.
The generalization of this method to N agents is then straightforward, such
that it includes all of the possible terms of the efficiency as∑〈a∗si |si〉+∑〈a∗si |bj〉 〈bj |si〉+∑〈a∗si |cj〉 〈cj |si〉+ · · ·
+
∑〈a∗si |ck〉 〈ck|bj〉 〈bj |si〉+ · · ·
+
∑〈a∗si |dl〉 〈dl|ck〉 〈ck|bj〉 〈bj |si〉+ · · ·
+ · · ·
... (25)
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In our introduced framework, communication actions are costly informa-
tive messages which are not noise-free unless γI = 0. One other option could
be when an agent can decide to communicate or not. In other words, some
teaching agents might decide not to send even an empty message from which
a protagonist agent may make use by performing at least a random action.
Last, depending on the objective of learning [29], a generalized belief state is
needed built upon the current world state, the observability parameter α, and
the distribution of the forgetting factors, etc.8A suggestion for building such
a more complicated belief state could be the use of a meta-learning approach
[3] considering a multi-agent setting.
4 Specific examples of a 2-agent invasion toy problem
The original formulation of PS has been introduced using a toy problem called
invasion game, as elaborated in [1,2]. To add partial observability employing
another agent to the original projective simulation, we can assume an inter-
preter added to the standard invasion problem. In the basic form of the invasion
game, an attacker (A) sends some precepts s ∈ {⇐,⇒} (in case N = 2) where
a defender (D) perceives and learns them by taking action a ∈ {−,+} on a
percept and getting a reward (λ).
{s1, s2} = {⇐,⇒}, {−,+} = {a1, a2}, (26)
where we can consider |si〉 = {| ⇐〉, | ⇒〉} and |ai〉 = {|−〉, |+〉} for N = 2 in
an invasion game.
While the theoretical asymptotic efficiency for a small amount of γ has been
derived for a fully observable one-defender invasion game [1,2], that derivation
cannot be used for an arbitrary choice of γ, even in the simple form of one
agent toy problem. The asymptotic efficiency related to a given agent ”D”,
that is rDmax = r
D
max(α, γD, γI), occurs with respect to limt→∞ h
(t)(s, a), based
on the adaptation rule of Eq. 2. This adaptation is changed stochastically,
however, in a big enough time, t → ∞; the averaged efficiencies on a large
number of agents (m) reach a certain asymptote for every forgetting factor
γ (see Appendix. 5). Then one can assume that there is an effective reward
function, λeff , for every γ, so that it becomes the averaged reward obtained
on a large number of agents m.〈∑
l
δ(ci, ckl)δ(cj , cml)λ
(t+1)
〉
m→∞
−→ λ(t+1)eff (ci, cj , γ), (27)
thus,
h(t+1)(ci, cj) = h
(t)(ci, cj)− γ(h(t)(ci, cj)− 1) + λ(t+1)eff (ci, cj , γ). (28)
8 For example, if the game is known or unknown or given the purpose of a game, a
coalitional strategy might be useful
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Furthermore, a constant reward in every time in Eq.2, namely,
λ(t+1)(ci, cj) = λ(ci, cj), (29)
leads to
hmax = lim
t→∞
h(t)(ci, cj) =
λeff (ci, cj, γ)
γ
+ 1. (30)
Then,
hmax =
{
λrewardeff
γ
+ 1 for a rewarded pair of (ci, cj)
1 for a non-rewarded pair of (ci, cj)
(31)
Due to the fact that λnon−rewardeff = 0, we rename λ
reward
eff = λ(γ) from now on.
Given N different percept-actions but just one desirable action a∗si for each
percept si, we have
p+ q (N − 1) = 1, (32)
and
pN (γ) =
λN (γ) + γ
λN (γ) +Nγ
, qN (γ) =
γ
λN (γ) +Nγ
, p(0) = 1, q(0) = 0.
(33)
Equations 33 are the evaluation of the asymptotic probabilities in our par-
tially observable multi-agent model of problems for which Eq. 29 is satisfied.
Otherwise, we may use the specific properties of a given scenario to have p
and q.
In the following, we consider an invasion with N = 2. Figure 7 shows the
effective reward of the rewarded pairs of (ci, cj) for a fully observable one-agent
invasion with λt+1(s, a∗s) = 1. For instance,
p2(γ → 1) −→ 1.2
2.2
, q2(γ → 1) −→ 1
2.2
. (34)
4.1 An example of an absolute partially observable environment according to
Equation 8
Fully observable environments have been considered widely under different
conditions. Here, we start from Eq. 8, which describes an environment in which
all of the percepts are invisible to the protagonist agent. In this case, the belief
percepts are produced by an interpreter (I), such as what is depicted in Fig. 8,
which comes indirectly to the defender (D). To be nontrivial, the interpreter
is not a kind of a simple mirror or a polarizer. Instead, it is another intelligent
agent that learns the percepts si by itself and sends what it is learning to the
defender as a new percept bi, where the defender percieves them and takes
actions ai on them. As it is assumed in the original paper [1], the defender
A Projective Simulation Scheme for Partially-Observable Multi-Agent Systems 13
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Fig. 7 Effective reward function (λreward
eff
) of a rewarded (ci, cj) for a fully observable
invasion toy problem with N = 2 with regard to λt+1 = 1 for two rewarded pairs of
(s, a) = {(⇒,+), (⇐,−)}, if traversed at the last time t, and λt+1 = 0 for other edges. The
results are averaged on m = 10000 agents in the time t = 1000
always reaches sooner to the next door than the attacker does (with or without
a stamp from the interpreter). The relevant reward function definition can be
found in Appendix. 5.
Fig. 8 A model of the partially observable invasion game. Adapted and modified from [1].
In addition to an attacker (A) and a defender (D), we have an interpreter (I) here. While
”D” can not detect the attacker’s percepts, ”I” observes these signs, learns them, and sends
them as some new percepts to the defender.
Figures 9(a) and 9(b) show a reduction in the speed of learning (or learning
time) in a partially observable environment (red solid curves) in comparison
with a fully observable one (dashed curves) when the interpreter’s forgetting
factor is zero. In contrast, there is a reduction in the efficiency of the defender,
as illustrated in 9(c) and 9(d), when the interpreter’s forgetting factor is more
than zero. While the reduction in the learning time is due to the fact that the
defender learning must wait for the interpreter learning, the non-vanishing
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decrease in the efficiency is owing to the portion of permanent partially ob-
servability arising from the interpreter’s forgetting factor.9
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Fig. 9 Comparison between blocking efficiencies of a defender in a partially observable
(PO) invasion game (red solid curves) and a fully observable (FO) invasion game (dashed)
with regard to different forgetting factors for both defender (D) and interpreter (I). Results
for the interpreter (blue curves) are illustrated using Eq.5, and the defender’s results are
illustrated using the blocking efficiency, r(t), of (Eq. 8). All of the curves are averaged over
10000 agents
Figure 10 illustrates the same property in Fig. 9(d) for the extreme dissi-
pation factor of γ = 1. It is worth noting that the multiplied probabilities of
Eq.8 reduce the maximum blocking efficiency of a partially observable envi-
ronment, in comparison with a fully observable one, for every γ > 0, even in
the case of the minimum efficiency of γ = 1. This is because the term including
γ in the adaptation rule of Eq. 2 refers to forgetting what the agent learned in
9 In the original works, the authors have plotted their figures for action blocking, whereas
mine have been planned in respect to the probability of action blocking using the fact that
action blocking averaged on an infinite number of actions would ultimately be equal to the
probability of doing an action; for more details, see Appendix 5.
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Fig. 10 Comparison of the blocking efficiency of a defender in an absolute partially observ-
able invasion (red solid line) and in the fully observable invasion (dashed) based on γ = 1
for both defender (D) and interpreter (I)
the previous states, but not the current state. Therefore, this adaptation rule
leaves something (even small) more than nothing (rmax > 0.5) for γ = 1 that
can be reduced in a partially observable environment.
4.2 An example of a general fully-partially observable environment according
to Equation 16
In a more general scenario, there are both partially and fully observable per-
cepts in the environment, where an agent is expected to act. A physics cor-
respondence for such a situation might be where two kinds of ray lights are
coming to a given (learning!) polarizer in the condition that the α portion of
the rays has already been polarized in the same direction of the polarizer. In
our invasion example, one can add some portion (α) of fully observability to
the problem. It means that the defender can see an α portion of its percepts
directly coming from the attacker and 1 − α portion coming indirectly from
the interpreter. As a tangible example of the situation, one can suppose that
the attacker’s signs are being sent in two different colors from which one of
these colors are invisible for a given defender.
Fig. 11 A model of the fully-partially observable invasion game, where, in addition to the
features of Fig. 8, a portion of percepts is fully observable for the defender and comes directly
from the attacker
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Figures. 9 and 10 are specific examples of the current scenario with the
observability parameter of α = 0. A comparison between the effect of the
defender’s forgetting factor (γD) and the interpreter’s forgetting factor (γD) is
illustrated in Fig. 12(a); that is, the former (Gamma D) dominates the latter
(Gamma I) in the amount of efficiency. Moreover, the effect of the reduction
of observability α in the amount of efficiency is depicted in Fig. 12(b). What
can apparently be seen from these two, Fig. 12(a) and Fig. 12(b), is that
the contribution of the defender itself to its efficiency is more important than
that of the interpreter. To be more clear, in the following, we focus on the
maximum blocking efficiency (asymptotic efficiency) containing both Gamma
factors (γD and γI). Figure 13 shows that, while the blocking efficiency in
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Fig. 12 Blocking efficiency of a defender in the general scenario of a fully-partially observ-
able environment of Fig.11. 12(a): with a certain portion of direct percepts (α), the direct
dissipating factor (Gamma D) reduces the efficiency much more than the indirect (Gamma
I), 12(b): The reduction in the amount of the fully observable percepts (α) can reduce the
amount of efficiency
the plane of γD = constant is altered drastically with changing α, the plane
of γI = constant has a few changes (respecting α alterations) in its amounts.
It is because the reduction of the observability α means an increase in the
contribution of the interpreter and thus, its dissipation factor γI becomes
more important. Therefore, as it might be expected, we can see that while
in α = 1 (Fig. 13(a)), the interpreter’s forgetting factor has no role in the
amount of maximum efficiency due to the fact that the environment is fully
observable in this case, it will be as influential as the defender’s gamma factor
in α = 0 (the absolute partially observable environment). Therefore, because
of the relevant game-theoretical considerations, in the next two asymptotic
figures, I will focus just on the plane of γD = constant to show more details.
Eventually, Fig. 14 compares the maximum blocking efficiencies of the de-
fender in some planes of γD = constant in a certain amount of α = 0.5.
Obviously, there is no intersection between the lines in Fig. 14, which refers
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Fig. 13 Maximum blocking efficiency (asymptotic efficiency) in some different α. Fig-
ure 13(a) belongs to α = 1, whereas Figs. 13(b) and 13(c) are depicted for α = 0.5 and
α = 0, respectively. The results averaged over 10000 agents
to the domination of a smaller γD for a given α.
10 Alternatively, when we
also introduce some different α factor in the planes of γD = const, there is a
bunch of plots (or a scattering) for every γD = const; we can see some inter-
section between the lines of the asymptotic efficiencies thereafter. As a result,
in a certain observability (α = const), the line of maximum blocking efficiency
dominates for a smaller γD = const; however, the ultimate domination of a
smaller γD can be annihilated by the changes in the amount of the observ-
ability of the environment. In the next section, we use this consequence to
further discuss related a 2-defender-interpreter game.
10 Although Fig. 14 is depicted just for α = 0.5, this consequence is true for every α =
constant that can be tracked in Fig. 15.
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Fig. 14 Comparison between different maximum blocking efficiencies for a given α = 0.5
in the slices of γD = const
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Fig. 15 A scattering happens in the lines of the maximum blocking efficiencies for γD =
const in different α factors. This scattering causes some intersections in the number of
maximum blocking efficiencies which cancel the permanent domination of a smaller γD =
const therein
4.3 A given 2-defender-interpreter invasion game
In this section, we consider an invasion including two agents X and Y , as
illustrated in Fig. 16; then, for every agent, X , there is a forgetting factor
γX . Due to the fact that every agent has two different tasks of blocking and
teaching (the domain action and the communication action, respectively), we
consider γX = γ1X + γ2X according to Eq. 22, where the first Gamma γ1X
stands for a forgetting factor in a blocking task belonging to the agent X and
the second Gamma γ2X refers to its forgetting factor in a teaching (helping)
task. Furthermore, it is assumed that every agent can select to be absolutely
selfish (γ1X = 0, γ2X = γX) as a defender, sacrifice its blocking task (γ1X =
γX , γ2X = 0) to be more helpful in teaching, or have every other selection
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among these two border options, namely, γX = (γ1X , γ2X), γ1X + γ2X = γX .
Therefore, it can be noticed that a selfish strategy is a zero-cost communication
for a given agent.
Fig. 16 A model of a two defender-interpreter invasion game. The scenario is the same as
Fig. 11 for every agent. To prevent any interfering percepts, one can consider each agent as
a defender (or interpreter) at any time or any round. A specefic clips network representation
has been illustrated in Fig.4
Then, one can have
rXmax(αX , γ1X , γ2Y ) = αX p(γ1X)+(1−αX) [p(γ1X).p(γ2Y ) + q(γ1X).q(γ2Y )] ,
(35)
according to Eq. 18. For example, if{
αX = αY = α,
∀k γkX = γkY = γk,
=⇒ rXmax(α, γk) = rYmax(α, γk), (36)
which refers to the symmetry of the problem between two agents. Otherwise,
the efficiency of one agent would differ from that of its partner as a function of
its own forgetting factor, its partner’s forgetting factor and also, the parameter
of observability of the environment for one agent. With the same variables of
γ1X , γ2Y , in Eq. 35, one would have
rYmax(αY , γ1X , γ2Y ) = αY p(γY − γ2Y ) + (1− αY )[p(γY − γ2Y ).p(γX − γ1X)
+ q(γY − γ2Y ).q(γX − γ1X)]. (37)
4.3.1 Classes of coalitions
Considering the collective efficiency of two gaents as rcol = r
X
max + r
Y
max, one
may ask about the classes of coalitions (see [19] p. 386 for the definitions)
in this game by comparing two cases: rcol−FO(γX , γY ) in a fully observale
environment versus rcol−PO(αX , αY , γ1X , γ2Y ) in a partially observable envi-
ronment. The former is straightforward as
rcol−FO(γX , γY ) = p(γX) + p(γY ) (38)
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on the one hand. However, considering the latter, we deal with a four vari-
able function. At first, we can see that every selfish-selfish coalition γX =
(0, γX) & γY = (0, γY ) will be superadditive,
rXmax = αX + (1− αX) p(γY ) = p(γY ) + αX q(γY ),
rYmax = αY + (1− αY ) p(γX) = p(γX) + αY q(γX).
Then,
rcol−PO(αX , αY , γ1X = 0, γ2Y = γY ) ≥ rcol−FO(γX , γY ). (39)
Equation 39 will be satisfied for every 0 ≤ γX , γY ≤ 1. Specifically, the un-
derlying reason for being a superaddition in the selfish-selfish coalition of
γX = γY = 1 is that it will increase the collective efficiency only due to the
use of random information that two players share with each other; namely, the
communication in this particular case is just sending an empty message with
the zero-cost.
Secondly, in the case of a sacrifice-sacrifice coalition, γX = (γX , 0) & γY =
(γY , 0), we can obtain r
X
max = p(γX), r
Y
max = p(γY ) according to Eq. 35, that
is independent of αX & αY . Therefore,
rcol−PO(αX , αY , γ1X = γX , γ2Y = 0) = rcol−FO(γX , γY ). (40)
Hence, every sacrifice-sacrifice coalition will be an additive game. On the
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Fig. 17 Maximum collective blocking efficiency in a 2-agent invasion game rcol−PO of
Fig. 16, as compared with the maximum collective blocking efficiency in a fully observable
environment rcol−FO = p(γX)+p(γY ) (the black line). The results have been illustrated for
γX = γY = 1 and two cases of αX = αY = α. Figure 17(a) is for α = 0, where its maximums
have accrued in the sacrifice-selfish and selfish-sacrifice selections, and Fig. 17(b) is for
α = 1, where the maximum happens in the selfish-selfish selection
contrary, while there are numerous selections for which the coalition is super-
additive, especially in the big α factors (see Fig. 17(b) for αX = αY = 1),
there are many other selections for which rcol−PO < rcol−FO, according to the
example of Fig. 17(a), especially for small observability parameters.
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4.3.2 Equilibrium
After all, we can consider the maximum blocking efficiencies of X and Y as a
simple symmetric game. Furthermore, with γX = γY = 1, we can analyze the
game using the results in Sec. 4.2 and considering a small adjustment in the
variables as
γD → γ1X , γI → γ2Y , α→ αX . (41)
regarding the agent X .
Beside this, if we assume the two agents as two players, then every selection
of every agent for its forgetting factor can be considered as a different pure
strategy. For the condition of γ1X + γ2X = γ1Y + γ2Y = 1, a given pure
strategy A would be a selection as A ≡ γ = [γA, 1 − γA]. Therefore, we
can have two players for 2 different pure strategies A,B and build our game
such that playing A[γA, 1− γA] for two agents means two agents have similar
selections for their blocking and teaching forgetting factors. In addition, a
payoff obtained by every agent could be considered as its maximum efficiency
rmax(α) as a function of observability for every pure strategy. Having in mind
that αX 6= αY , then in a general situation, there would be a variety of different
payoffs for every agent.
Nevertheless, regarding the modification of Eq.41, considering some other
restrictions might be helpful. One can see that if every agent can choose be-
tween A(αA) and B(αB), then we can have a game as the following
player2 (Y )
player1(X)
A(αA) B(αB)
A(αA) a, a c, d
B(αB) d, c b, b
, where the lowercase Latin letters refer to the playoffs of each player for a
given pure strategy.{
a = rmax(αA, γA, 1− γA)
b = rmax(αB , γB, 1− γB)
,
{
c = rmax(αA, γA, 1− γB)
d = rmax(αB, γB, 1− γA).
(42)
Suppose that we always have γA < γB . Then, considering the modification
of Eq.41, Fig. 14 as an example of α = constant and tracking other plots in
Fig. 15 for other examples of α = constant show that in a certain amount of
α, we have a+ c > b + d. Therefore, the strictly dominant strategy for every
player is being absolutely selfish (selecting the lowest amount of the blocking
forgetting factor), and since we have symmetry between the two agents, then
(absolute) selfishness is also the only Nash equilibrium. It is a pure strategy
strictly dominant for each player as well as Pareto optimal in the case of
αA = αB; it can also be considered as the fair share (the simplest Shapley
value) between the agents in a superadditive coalition game.
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In contrast, Fig. 15 shows that regarding different amounts of the observ-
ability parameter, αA 6= αB, one could have more complicated games. For
example, the (absolute) selfishness as the Nash equilibrium can be dominated
by another Pareto optimal solution which brings about a higher payoff to the
two agents. For instance, tracking the scattering between the maximum and
the minimum curves of rmax for γ1X = 0 (αX = 0.99 and αX = 0, respectively)
in Fig. 15 shows that there would be a variety of other selections of γ1X 6= 0
for which the related rmax has some intersections with that of (absolute) self-
ishness of γ1X = 0 with αX = 0. In other words, regarding different amounts
of observability (αA 6= αB), one can build other games such as a dilemma to
be played as A(αA) or B(αB). Even more particularly, one can count for the
payoffs if γA = 0, γB = 0.9 and αA = 0 and αB = 1, leading to
p(1), p(1) p(0.1), p(0.9)
p(0.9), p(0.1) p(0.9), p(0.9)
We can see that while p(1) is the Nash equilibrium, p(0.9) > p(1) is the Pareto
optimal strategy; however, p(0.9) is not a Nash equilibrium itself.
4.4 Multi-agent invasion game
We bring a couple of 3-agent situated examples. The rest of the scenarios
can be built upon a combination or modification of this two, as mentioned in
Sec. 3.2.
On the one hand, Fig. 18 is a specific example from the invasion game
based on Eq. 23 and its clips network representation of Fig. 5. On the other
Fig. 18 A 3-agent invasion game where the agents X and Y are both the simultaneous
protagonist-interpreter and Z is the second layer of interpretation
hand, Fig. 19 is a particular example of the invasion game based on Eq. 24
and the related network of clips representation of Fig. 6.
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Fig. 19 A 3-agent invasion game where there are three protagonist-interpreter agents as
X, Y and Z
5 Conclusion
In this paper, we added two new concepts of the belief projection operator and
the observability parameter to the original scheme of projective simulation (PS)
for the performance of an agent in a partially observable environment. In short,
a given projector makes some belief states from the world states to the extent of
the observability parameter of a given environment. Therefore, an individual
policy for an agent can be defined as a map from the agent’s belief state
|(S+B)j〉 to an action |aj〉. We used our method in a multi-agent setting where
the projector was a second agent called an interpreter. Then we generalized our
arrangement to include a system involving more than two agents. Although
we expressed our results classically, our formulation with the modification of
〈a|s〉 → |〈a|s〉|2 and their corresponding network representations could be used
in the quantum regime too.
For a defender, in our invasion example, the fully observable percepts were
coming directly from the attacker while the partially observable ones were
conveying indirectly through the interpreter. We continued our case example
to include a 2-agent toy problem, where, on one hand, the selfishness selection
regarding a two-part forgetting factor could be considered as a zero-cost com-
munication option giving rise to a superadditive coalition. On the other hand,
the selfishness could be considered as a Nash equilibrium, though it could
be dominated by another Pareto optimal strategy in case αi 6= αj . One can
distinguish between the belief states and the world states by adding another
property, such as different colors, to them for simplicity. That is, for example,
|s〉 ∈ {| ⇐〉, | ⇒〉} and |b〉 ∈ {|⇐〉, |⇒〉} for N = 2 in a partially observable
invasion toy problem. However, it is important to note that the additional
properties such as different colors do not play a significant role in the theory
of partial observability of Eq. 16. In fact, the underlying difference between
the original PS (a compositional memory added to an episodic memory) and
the current study is the difference between the forgetting factor of an episodic
memory and the forgetting factor of a compositional memory, here (γpa 6= γI).
At the same time, as shown in Appendix. 5, there will be some limitations
as using ”edge glow” to expand a single-agent PS learning method toward a
multi-agent approach.
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Although the system state remained jointly fully observable, there was not
a joint reward function in our formulation to build a decentralized approach.
Instead, there has been selected a self-interested perspective, similar to the
existing interactive literature. However, the method needs further works to
create a generalized belief state regarding some beliefs including agents’ pa-
rameters as well as the environmental parameters to build either decentralized
or interactive schemes depending on the situation. It might be done utilizing
a meta-learning [3] or other optimal solutions with respect to the amounts of
forgetting factors, etc. in the specific problems. As might be expected, other
works can be done considering centralized and decentralized approaches in-
cluding sharing clips, sharing rewards or sharing policies, etc. among some
cooperating agents such as multi-agent grid-world tasks mentioned in [26] or
tiger toy problem [32,33].
Moreover, there could be an interesting quantum consideration too. This
is because some clips in the networks belong to different agents that can be
spatially separate from the other clips, which require the notion of remote
entanglement in the quantum context. Similarly, there are some approximate
branches in literature such as distributed quantum computation and quantum
game theory [34,35,37,36,40,41,38].
Nonetheless, in my opinion, the PS model and its partially observable
method can be considered widely in psychology or behavioural economics too.
Owing to an assumptive difference between the fictitious memory clips of s©, a©
and their actual counterparts (s, a), the approach might be a compelling con-
text for understanding the various decision-making processes among artificial
people in a certain condition via different perceptions of a specific situation.
For example, merging some memory clips in some compositional memory may
be applied to build an abstract clip network which can be related to a creative
thinking or an illusion related to one type of personality as ”openness to new
experiences” [28] in the five-factor model, which we might consider as another
study.
Further, the partially observable PS might be utilized in psychology by
itself. Because a projector may not be just an exterior interpreter; instead,
it can be considered as an interior brain structure of a given agent. For in-
stance, a brain can have some projections from the childhood; as a result, it
touches on the perception of a given situation and therefore, affects the perfor-
mance or the decision-making processes. Consequently, an internal projection
as a part might bring about some subconscious notion among individuals or
even different cultures among societies via some more general interior-exterior
projectors.
Finally, as we saw, the transparency was dependent on three parameters,
the environment parameter α, the agent parameter γpa and the belief states af-
fected by another agent, γI . In a general perspective, after all, the transparency
or a given perception can be dependent on the environment, the agent itself,
and its society.
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Appendix 1: Actions versus the probability of actions
While in the original papers of PS, the averaged performing rewarded actions are depicted for
the efficiency, we used the probability of doing rewarded actions r(t) for the same purpose.
It is due to the fact that the probability of doing an action in a large time step t, as in
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Fig. 20 Blocking actions (blue) versus the probability of blocking, r(t) of Eq. 4, in a fully
observable and changing environment for the one agent invasion game (N = 2). Figures are
depicted for γ = 0.1
Fig. 20, is a better approximation for r(t→∞) than the real actions in t.
Appendix 2: Reward function for the 2-agent invasion and the edge
glow
The reward function λ for a pair of percept-action in a fully observable one agent scenario
is defined as {
λ(si, ak) > 0, i = k
λ(si, ak) = 0, i 6= k.
(43)
For a multi-agent approach, on the other hand, we might have different options. However,
we have to know that our reward definition shouldn’t destroy the partial observability or
other agents’ contribution that is in opposition to the purpose.
For our solved interactive invasion problem of the paper, I used the rewards as{
λ(si, ak) = 1, i = k
λ(si, ak) = 0, i 6= k
,
{
λ(si, bj) = 1, i = j
λ(si, bj) = 0, i 6= j
,
{
λ(bj , ak) = 1, j = k
λ(bj , ak) = 0, j 6= k.
(44)
The relevant network representation for one of the world percepts (⇒) is shown in Fig. 21(a).
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One may suppose that employing a reward for the blocking actions and using the ”edge
glow” [2] could speed up learning as depicted in Fig. 21(b). However, such a bypass reward
option is omitting the interpreter as another learning agent. Because
p(γpa).p(γI) + q(γpa).q(γI ) ≤ p(γpa) (45)
in Fig. 21(a), which refers to the partial observability of the environment for the protagonist
agent as indicated in Eq. 20 (the equality sign in Eq. 45 is preserved for γI = 0). But,
p(γpa).p
′(γI ) + p(γpa).q
′(γI ) = p(γpa)[p
′(γI ) + q
′(γI )] = p(γpa) (46)
in Fig. 21(b), by which the partial observability and the role of the interpreter will be
destroyed completely. As a result, we have chosen Fig. 21(a) and Eq. 44 for the interactive
reward function.
(a) (b)
Fig. 21 Two given reward schemes for one of the world percepts (⇒) of the interactive
invasion game. Fig. 21(a) is depicted for the reward functions as defined in Eq.44, and
Fig. 21(b) is (a wrong option) related to utilizing an edge glow in case the rewards are given
to the blocking actions
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